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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION 
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
COMPANY, 
Plailntiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP 





APPELLANT'S REP'LY BRIEF 
Plaintiff and appellant, National Farmers Union 
Property and Casualty Company, submi,ts herewith its 
brief in reply to defendant and respondents contention 
as set forth in Point I of Respondent's Brief as follows : 
The automobile driven by John H. Morgan, Jr. was 
being used in the autmnobile business and, ~therefore, 
was not covered by the defendant's policy. 
The nature of the case and the disposition thereof 
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RELIEF SOUGIIT 
Plaintiff and appellant seeks to have the Supreme 
Court.: 
A. Strike Point I of Respondent's Brief and the 
argument relating thereto, or 
B. Sustain the finding and conclusion of the 
Trial Court on the question dealt with in Point I of 
Respondent's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are adequately set forth both in Appel-
lant's Brief and Respondent's Brief on the question 
covered by this Reply Brief. 
ARGUl\1:ENT 
POINT I 
THE CONTENTION EXPRESSED BY DEFENDANT 
AND RESPONDENT, FARMERS INSURANCE EX·CHANGE, 
IN POINT I OF RESPONDENT'S BRIEF THAT THE AUTO· 
MOBILE DRIVEN BY JOHN H. MORGAN, JR., WAS BEING 
USED IN THE AUTOMOBILE BUSINESS AND, THERE-
FORE, WAS NOT COVERED BY THE DEFENDANT'S 
POLICY IS NOT BEFORE THE COURT ON APPEAL AND 
THEREFORE, NOT PROPERLY PART OF RESPONDENT'S 
BRIEF. 
The facts relating to the use of the loaned automobile 
and the accident which subsequently occurred were sub-
mitted to the trial court upon stipulation between counsel 
for plaintiff and defendant ( Tr. 1, :2) and upon hearing 
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the facts and argtillll'nt the trial court held. that the 
loaned auton10bile was not being used in the automobile 
business at the tiine of the accident (Tr. 8, 9). 
Paragraph 1 of the Conclusions of Law (part of the 
record in this matter) reflects this finding by the Court. 
Inasmuch as it was found as a 1natter of fact and 
concluded as a matter of law by the trial court that the 
use of the automobile by Mr. Morgan was not a use in 
the automobile business and this finding and conclusion 
was in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, plaintiff 
made no appeal fron1 that part of the judg~nent. Appel-
lant's appeal was taken from the judgment entered in 
favor of defendant and against plaintiff and upon all 
ques·tions of law and fact upon the whole record in this 
cause as it relates to that judgment. 
It is not the desire of appellant to have matters 
reviewed on appeal ~that have been resolved in its favor 
at trial. Nor was the matter of use of the automobile 
in the automobile business dealt with in appellant's brief. 
Notwithstanding, respondent did not prosecute a 
cross-appeal to have this matter reviewed on appeal as 
it was entitled to do and as provided for in Rules 75 (d) 
and 74 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; nor does 
respondent seek to have the mrutter of use of the auto-
mobile reviewed on appeal for any justifiable reason 
since the trial court concluded as a matter of law that 
the automobile was not being so used when the aceident 
occurred (R. 41) and respondent seeks to have the judg-
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ment of the trial court sustained. See Re-spondent's 
Brief, page 3. 
Appellant, therefore, respectfully submits that Point 
I of Respondent's Brief and the argument relating 
thereto are not before this Court for purposes of review 
and therefore cannot and should not he considered by 
this Court. 
POINT II 
- THE AUTOMOBILE DRIVEN BY JOHN H. MORGAN, 
JR. WA:S NOT BEING USED IN THE AUTOMOBILE BUSI-
NESS AND, THEREFORE, WAS COVERED BY DEFEN-
I)ANT'S POLICY. 
In discussing the use of automobiles in the auto-
mobile business under Point II of this brief, appellant 
incorporates its argument as set forth under Point I 
of this reply brief and herewith proceeds to present 
argument ·relating to this matter without prejudice to 
its position as stated therein. 
The policy. issued by defendant, Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, to Raymond Earl Thomas, its insured, con-
tains the following provisions : 
"Additional definitions under Part I. 
( 4) Automobile Business. Automobile business 
me·ans the business of selling, repairing, servicing, stor-
ing or parking automobiles, their parts or equipment." 
Under the heading of Exclusions Under Part I the 
policy provides : 
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''This policy does not apply under Part I : 
6. vVhile the <lescribed automobile is being used in 
the automobile business, but this exclusion does not 
apply to the nruned insured or his relatives." 
John I-I. 1\forgan, Jr. was not ihe named insured 
under the policy issued by Farmers Insurance Exchange 
to Mr. Thomas, nor was he a relative of n1r. rl"homas, 
the named insured. What this means under the pro-
visions of the policy set forth above is that if nfr. Thomas 
or any of his relatives use the insured vehicle in the 
bu~inesf$ of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or park-
ing automobiles, their parts or equipment, coverage 
would still be afforded under the policy. However, if 
Mr. Morgan used the insured automobile for any of 
the above reasons then the exclusion indicated would 
be applicable. 
It is not enough to say that the insured automobile 
was being used in the automobile business at the time 
of the .accident and therefore no coverage afforded in 
this instance, but it must be shown that 1\fr. }\forgan 
so used the insured car. From the facts as stipulated 
to by the parties it is abundantly clear that nfr. Morgan 
was not using 1\fr. Thon1as' car to sell other cars, nor 
was he using it for the purpose of repairing, servicing, 
storing or parking other automobiles, their parts or 
equipment. l-Ie v,-as using the loaned automobile for his 
own personal and private use, not connected with any 
business transaction, i.e., he was using the automobile 
he had borrowed to go to his home to enjoy the con-
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venience of riding rather ~than the inconvenience of walk-
ing. The Thomas oar was being so used whiJle Mr. 
Morgan's car was bet'ng repaired. 
Appellant therefore asserts that the coverage exclu-
sion applicable when the insured automobile is being 
used in the automobile business is not applicable in this 
situation by reason of the terms of the defendant's policy 
and by reason of the facts of the case. 
The question of use of insured automobiles in the 
automobile business has been dealt with by many juris-
dictions. Although the exclusionary provision of the 
policies scrutinized have been very similar the facts 
regarding the use to which the insured automobile was 
put have differed significantly. 
Cherat vs. United States Fidelity and Guaranty 
Company and Central Sur:ety and Insurance Company, 
264 F. 2d 767 (lOth Cir., Okla., 1959), 71 A.L.R. 2d 859, 
arose out of a declaratory judgment action in which 
the two appellee insurance companies sought and ob-
tained a declaratory judgment, declaring that they were 
not required to defend a damage action under policies of 
insurance which t'hey had issued which action arose out 
of an automobile accident. U.S.F. & G. had issued its 
policy to one Schultz on an Auburn make automobile 
involved in the collision and Central Surety had issued 
its policy to 1\ir. Carter, both policies being conventional 
liability insurance policies. Schultz O"\V'Iled the 1932 
Auburn automobile which he left with Carter for repairs. 
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vVhile the car was being driven by Carter it was involved 
in the accident in which Cherot was injured. 
Carter and ~chultz both worked for the same purnp 
company. Carter's hobby was that of being an autornobile 
mechanic and was wo:ddng on Schultz's automobile for 
the cost of parts, electricity used, and a small amount 
for storage. Although there was no agreement as to 
payment for labor, Schultz testified that he intended to 
pay Carter for his labor even though no n1ention had 
ever been made between ~them for any charge other than 
the actual expenses. 
The U.S.F. & G. policy provided that it should not 
apply "to an owned automobile while used in the auto-
mobile business." The Central Surety and Insurance 
Company policy excluded coverage on a "non-owned 
automobile while used (1) in ~the automobile business 
by the insured." Central's policy also contained this 
provis~ion: "automobile business means the business of 
selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking of auto-
mobiles." 
In reversing the declaratory judgment in favor of 
the insurance companies, the Circui~t Court said: 
"vVe are dealing here with an exclusionary 
clause. Such provisions are strictly construed. 
These policies were prepared by the insurance 
companies. In the absence of a clear showing 
therein to the contrary, it must be assumed that 
the word "automobile business" as used in the 
exclusionary clause means business in the ordi-
nary accepted sense - that is, an undertaking 
engaged in with some regularity a1't1d for profit 
and ifncmne/' (E1nphasis added.) 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In another case with a rather complicated fact situa-
tion, National Union Indemnity Company issued its 
garage liability policy to All Shalloek, Inc. and Shallock 
Transportation, Inc. American Employers Insurance 
Company issued its automobile liability policy to Shal-
loek Transportation, Inc., describing a particular auto-
mobile. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company issued its 
automobile liability policy to Sealright, covering an 
automobile ordinarily driven by one Morrissey, who was 
an employee of Sealright, and also covering temporary 
substitute automobiles. The American Employees policy 
provided that the occupation of the named insured was 
''contract fleet leasing" and that the purposes for which 
the automobile was to he used were "pleasure and busi-
ness." Shallock Transportation, Inc. had authorized Al 
Shallock, Inc., which operated a garage, to lend the 
Shallock Transportation, Inc. automobile insured by the 
American Employees to customers. 
l\Iorrissey ordinarily drove a car provided him by 
Sealright, but had left it at Al Shallock, Inc. garage for 
repairs, borrowing from Al Shallock, Inc. the automobile 
owned by Shallock Transportation, Inc., and insured 
by American Employees. \Vhile operating this auto-
mobile Morrissey collided with Lubow. 
Lubow brought an action for damages against Mor-
rissey, Al Shallock, Inc., National Union, Shallock Trans-
portation, Inc., Ameriean E1nployees and Liberty Mutual. 
As part of the legal maneuvering that went on in the 
action Shallock Transportation, Inc. and American Em-
ployers moved for summary judg1nent dismissing the 
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contplaint and cro8s-cOinplaint on the ground that the 
garage exception on the mnnibus clause excluded cover-
age and on the further ground that the purpose of use 
of the automobile was lilnited to pleasure and business. 
On appeal the Suprerne Court o_f Wisconsin reversed 
that part of the judgn1ent dismissing American Employ-
ers holding (a) that the garage exception did not apply 
because it requires both that the person operating the 
automobile be an agent or an employee of the garage 
and that the accident arise out of the operation of the 
garage, whereas Morrissey was neither the operator nor 
the agent of the operator of a garage, (b) that the pur-
poses of use declaration did not deny coverage for Mor~ 
rissey since he was using the automobile for the purposes 
of his own business, which was neither that of Shallock 
Transportation, Inc., nor of a garage, since where the 
vehicle is insured for pleasure and business, that pro-
vision referred to the business or pleasure of any person 
using the autonwbile, whether the named insured or not. 
Lubow vs. illortTissey, 108 N.vV. 2d 156 (Wis. 1961). 
From exarnination of the Cherot and 11orrissey cases 
and considering them as they apply to the case on appeal 
herein, it is obvious that l\1r. l\forgan was not using the 
automobile owned by l\1r. Thomas and insured by de-
fendant and respondent in an undertaking that he en-
gaged in with some regularity for profit and incorne, 
but for his O'\Vn transportation to his horne. Nor was 
the automobile put to any use for Bountiful Motor Com-
pany by 1\Ir. 1\forgan. That 11r. 1\forgan's car was being 
repaired while the Thomas automobile was being used 
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is, appellant contends, completely irrelevant to the ques-
tion being considered. 
Other cases dealing with this problem are as follows : 
Stephmnelli vs. Yuhas, 135 Pa. Super. 573, 7 A. 2d 
124 ( 1939). The insurer issued a policy to Jean Walsh 
covering her automobile. The omnibus clause of the 
policy provided: ''Except that the terms and conditions 
of this policy shall not be available to a public automobile 
garage, automobile repair shop, automobile sales agency, 
automobile service station and the agents and employees 
thereof." Charles Walsh, husband of the named insured, 
conducted an automobile repair shop. 
Yuhas was employed as a truck driver by a leather 
company. The truck broke down and Yuhas took it to 
the repair shop for service. A required tie bolt was 
not in stock and it was necessary to obtain it in Scranton, 
a town some distance away. Yuhas stated that he had 
to go to Scranton for his pay check. Walsh gave Yuhas 
permission to operate the automobile of .Jean Walsh to 
Scranton to ,obtain the tie bolt and the pay check. Yuhas 
was being paid by the leather company for his time. 
While Yuhas was on the way to Scranton an acci-
dent occurred in which Stephanelli was injured. In an 
action by the injured person against Yuhas, judgment 
was recovered against Yuhas. The insurance carrier 
contended that defendant was an en1ployee of Walsh 
and as such the car was being used in the automobile 
business and hence the exclusion applicable. 
10 
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The trial Court found that Yuhas was not an em-
ployee of Charles Walsh and entered judgment against 
the insurer, who appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, 
holding that the evidence warranted a finding that Yuhas 
was an insured under the policy. 
Employers Mt~;tual Casualty Company of Des Moines, 
Iowa vs. F.ederate.d 111utual Implement and Hardware 
Insurance Company, 213 F. 2d 421 (8th Cir., N~D. 1954). 
Federated issued a garage liability policy to Ulvick's, a 
corporation engaged at Aneta, North Dakota, in the sale 
of farm implements and Chevrolet automobiles. The 
policy covered the corporation and its officers for the 
use of any automobile "in connection with" the eor-
poration's operations, the use in connection with the 
corporation's operations of any automobile not owned 
or hired by the corporation, and the use for "non-busi-
ness purposes of any automobile * * * in charge of the 
named insured and used principally in the garage busi-
ness.'' 
Employers l\1utual issued its automobile policy to 
Lusty covering a 1947 Chevrolet owned by him. Lusty 
was an employee of the corporation. His car was not 
used principally in the corporation's business and had 
never been used by Mr. Ulvick, president of the cor-
poration. 
Mr. Ulvick's daughter, who attended the University 
of North Dakota at Grand Forks, 65 miles from Aneta, 
with her father's permission, took with her for her per-
sonal use a 1951 Chevrolet demonstrator owned by the 
11 
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corporation. She rendered no service for the corporation 
either at home or at Grand Forks. The daughter was 
instructed by her father to call him if the demonstrator 
gave her any trouble. On December 22, 1951, when the 
daughter undertoo:k to use the demonstrator to drive 
home for the Christmas Holidays, it failed to start. 
She called her father pursuant _to his instructions and 
was told that he would drive to Grand Forks to fix the 
demonstrator. 
Because a corporation owned pickup truck was un-
usable, Lusty offered his 1947. Chevrolet automobile to 
Mr. Ulvick. The latter accepted Lusty's offer and placed 
in the car the necessary equip1nent for repairing the 
dmnonstrator. He intended to fix the demonstrator, have 
his daughter drive it to Aneta, and, if he had tune to do 
so, look at some equipment for sale at East Grand 
Forks for possible purchase by the corporation, before 
he returned to Aneta. l-Ie would not have made the pro-
posed trip to East Grand Forks except for his daughter's 
call. 
While Mr. Ulvick was driving Lusty's car on the 
way to Grand For.ks an accident occurred in which sev-
eral people were injured. The injured sued Mr. Ulvick 
for damages. 
Federated 1\futual, the garage corporation and :Mr. 
Ulvick brought an action in the United States District 
Court for the District of North Dakota seeking a declar-
atory jud,gment against the Employers nfutual. The 
District Court found as a fact that ~[r. Flvirk's :mission 
12 
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was a personal one not involving or incidental to the 
corporation's business and held that Employers Mutual 
policy covered him and that Federated's did not. Em-
ployers Mutual appealed. 
The Court of Appeals affinned holding ( 1) that 
if the demonstrator was not being used by the daughter 
in the garage business the use of Lusty's car to go to its 
aid would not be use in the operation of the corporation's 
business, (2) that since Lusty's car was not used prin-
cipally in the garage business, it was not covered under 
the garage policy for non-business use, (3) that the 
District Court was justified in concluding that the con-
tingent possibility of an inspection of garage equipment 
at East Grand Forks was not even an incidental reason 
for the trip, ( 4) that the garage exception in the omnibus 
clause of the Employer's Mutual policy on Lusty's car 
therefore did not exclude coverage for Ulvick. 
Commercial Sta;ndard Insurance Company vs. San-
ders, 326 S.W. 2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App., 1959). The insurer 
issued to Sanders its 1956 standard family automobile 
policy affording collision coverage. Said policy provided 
that it did not apply "to a loss to a non-owned automobile 
arising ·out of its use by the insured in the automobile 
business." The policy covered Sander's automobile. 
Sanders was employed as a car salesman for an 
automobile dealer in -Houston. He had formerly been 
mnployed in :Madisonville and had left his family there. 
During the week he lived in Ilouston but had arranged 
with his employer's sales manager to drive its demon-
13 
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strator from Houston to his home in l\'ladisonville for 
the wee:kend. Upon arrival at ~iadisonville Sanders left 
his employer's car at his home and used his personal car. 
He made no effort to sell cars while he was there. On 
Sunday, Sanders called the sales manager from 1\!adison-
ville, requesting permission to remain away from work 
Monday to effect a personal trade of his house in Madi-
sonville for one in Houston. 
On Monday, he and the man involved in the real 
estate negotiation left Madisonville in separate cars to 
look at the Houston property. While Sanders was making 
this trip in the employer's car a collision occurred. 
This &ction was brought to construe the insurance 
policy. Sanders testified that he was ''going to bring 
the car back" to his employer after the trip in question. 
The T'rial Court found that the automobile was not 
being used by Sanders in the automobile business at the 
time of the collision. The insurer appealed from an 
adverse judgment. 
The Court of Civil Appeal affinned, holding that 
the ·Trial Court had correctly concluded that Sanders 
was not using the automobile in the automobile business 
at the time of the collision. 
Other cases dealing with this question are Chavers 
vs. St. Paul F~re and Mari·ne Insurance Company, 188 
:U'. Supp. 39 (U.S.D.C. Ohio, 1960), holding that the 
operation of a parking lot for patrons by a restaurant 
where an attendant parked cars with the permission of 
14 
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the patrons was not a use of the particular car in the · 
automobile business. 
Pilvero vs. Allstate Insurance Company, 12 App. 
Div. 2d 130, 209· N.Y.S. 2d 90 (1960), affirming 22 Misc. 
2d -!15, 195 N.Y.S. 2d 89 (1959), also to the effect that 
an attendant parking cars of patrons. of a bakery and 
restaurant for a fee with lknowledge and consent of the 
owners of the business was not a use of automobiles 
in the automobile business. 
West Michigan Do-ck & Market Corpo·ration vs. St. 
Paul- Mercury Indemnity Company, 82 F. Supp. 403 
(U.S.D.C., Mich., 1949) affirmed without opinion 179 
F. 2d 242 (6th Cir.) holding that where an employee 
of a dock company who drove· the insured automobile 
onto a ramp with the consent of the owner preparatory 
to its being loaded onto a steamship and where the 
automobile rolled down the ramp killing a certain person, 
was not a use of the vehicle in the automobile business 
nor was the dock company operating a public parking 
place despite the fact that it occasionally permitted 
groups using the boats to park their cars on a lot out-
side the enclosed area owned by the company. 
J.lfcCree vs. Jenning, 155 Wash. 798, 349 P. 2d 1071, 
where Jenning delivered his automobile for repairs to 
Richard Miller, an automobile mechanic. After the re-
pairs were completed, Jenning requested that Miller 
deliver the automobile back to him. The car needed 
gasoline before it could be returned to its owner. Frall!k 
Farrell, a friend who was visiting Miller took the auto-
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mobile to have it filled with gasoline and on the way 
to the service station was invo~ved in a collision with 
McCree. 
McCree filed suit against Jenning, Farrell and Miller 
and recovered judgment against all three parties and 
instituted garnishment proceedings against Farrell's lia-
bility insurance carrier. 
It was contended that the automobile was being used 
in the automobile business and that insurance coverage 
was excluded. However, both the trial court and the 
Supreme Court held that Farrell was merely accom-
modating a friend, who in turn was accommodating a 
customer and that the vehicle was not being used in 
the automobile business. The court stated that: 
"* * * an automobile 'used in the automobile 
business,' would be one which was employed for 
some purpose in connection with that business. 
For example, a tow truck, an automobile used 
for demonstration purposes, or a vehicle used 
for securing or delivering equipment and supplies 
would be 'used in the· business.' " 
LeFelt vs. Nasarow, 177 A. 2d 315 (N.J. Super.) 
holding that a customer's automobile in the custody or 
possession of an automobile repairman who drives it 
for the purpose of testing the repairs which he has made 
is not being used in the automobile business within the 
meaning of an exclusionary clause in an insurance policy. 
For other cases and annotations treating this and 
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The case of Canadian Indernnity Company vs. Na-
tional Insurance Company, 134 Cal. .App. 2d 512, 286 
P. 2d 532 ( 1955) is distinguishable on its facts from the 
case on appeal herein. In that case the owner of an 
automobile repair shop and service station borrowed 
his employee's car to go for some parts that were needed 
in repairing another vehicle. Before leaving on the 
errand the owner of the repair shop learned that a 
friend, a parts salesman who often made the deliveries 
was ill. The salesman's hmne and the establishment 
where the parts were loooted were in the same general 
direction and while the owner of the repair shop was 
on his way to see the ill salesman, before going to pick 
up the parts, an accident occurred. 
The liability insurance policy of the employee of 
the repair shop owner excluded from coverage any per-
son or organization, or agent or employee thereof, oper-
ating an automobile repair shop, etc., "with respect to 
any accident arising out of the operation thereof," and 
it was held that such exclusion applied to the situation 
presented therehy relieving the insurance company from 
liability. 
In the Canadian Indemnity case the owner of the 
repair shop was using the insured automobile wfhile 
engaged in repairing other automobiles and, in fact, 
was using the insured vehicle to pick up the parts with 
which to carry on his business. It should be noted also, 
that the original and primary purpose of the trip was 
to pick up automobile parts, the visit to the salesn1an 
that was ill being only incidental. Not by any stretch 
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:>f the facts or the imagination of respondent in this 
matter can the situation presented in the Canadian In-
demnity case be made to square with the situation pre-
sented in the case on appeal herein. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant urges that the question of whether the 
automobile used by J\:Ir. Morgan was being used in the 
automobile business is not reviewable by this Court 
in this appeal and should therefore be stricken from 
respondent's brief. However, without pre·judiee to that 
position appellant contends that the Thomas automobile 
was not being used in the automobile business at the 
time of the accident. 
If it is contended by respondent that the vehicle 
was being used in the automobile business at the time 
of the accident to what business use was it being put 
and hy whom~ 
Certainly, under the definition of automobile busi-
ness in respondent's policy no such use was being made 
of the car, for Mr. ~1organ was not even in "the business 
of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking auto-
mobiles, their parts or equipment" and was not using 
the automobile he borrowed from Mr. Thon1as for that 
purpose. No such use of the automobile was being made 
of the Thomas car as automobile business is described 
in McCree vs. Jenning, for Mr. Morgan was not using 
the car as a demonstrator or for securing or delivering 
equipment and supplies. Respondent asserts in its brief 
that the Thomas aut01nobile was being used in the same 
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manner that a demonstrator or other vehicle may he 
used. If so, by wh01n 1 Not by appellant's insured, John 
H. Morgan, Jr., for he was not attempting to demonstrate 
the advantages of this particular car to anyone. There 
is no evidence that he even desired to purchase a new 
car. All that Mr. Morgan desired was that his car be 
repaired as quickly, efficiently and economically as pos-
sible so that he might not experience the inconvenience 
of being without his own car. 
If Raymond Earl Thomas was using the insured 
automobile as a demonstrator so that he might obtain 
a sale to Mr. Morgan in the future, and if this use of the 
car was in the autom·obile business, then the exclusionary 
provision in respondent's policy is inapplicable in this 
situation because the automobile business ''exclusion 
does not apply to the named insured or his relatives." 
It cannot be said that Bountiful Motor Company 
was using the Thomas automobile in the automobile 
business because when Mr. ~forgan asked Kay Browning, 
the service manager, for the use of a service vehicle 
while his was being repaired he was advised that no 
garage automobile was available. The customer, John 
~Iorgn, Jr., was referred by the service manageT to 
Dean Roberts, a car salesman, in an effort to obtain 
the use of Roberts' personal car. Upon being advised 
that l\Ir. Roberts' car was not available, Mr. Morgan 
was then referred to Raymond Earl Thomas for the 
use of Mr. Thomas' pe·rsonal car, which he obtained 
with Thomas' pennission, not by authorization of the 
service 1nanager of Bountiful ?\[otor Company. 
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In view of the facts, authorities and argument pre-
sented, appellant concludes and therefore asserts that 
this Court should strike Point I and the argument relat-
ing thereto in respondent's brief, or in the event the 
Court should find the matter of use of the insured 
automobile properly before it for purposes of review, 
then the decision of the trial court on the matter of use 
of the automobile should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
D. GARY CHRISTIAN, Esq . 
.Attorney for Plaintiff 
a;nd A ppellarnt 
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